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Historic Preservation Litigation: A Case

Study
STEPHEN L. KASS*
To show how lawyers and preservation groups use the preservation statutes, I will focus on Save the Courthouse Committee v. Lynn,' a case brought in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. The case involved the
proposed demolition of a six-building complex in White Plains
known as the old Westchester County Courthouse. That Courthouse site was to be the central piece of a major urban renewal
project planned by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) 2 and the White Plains Urban Renewal
Agency.' These agencies had had this plan in mind since the
early 1960s, well before the enactment of either the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)" or the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.1 A contract had been signed with
HUD for the Urban Renewal Agency program in general, which
included demolition of the buildings.
The buildings, however, had been identified by a serious
Westchester student of architecture and preservation as significant or potentially significant, and it appeared to the Department of the Interior6 and to the New York State Historic Preservation Officer 7 that the buildings were eligible for inclusion on
the National Register.$ Furthermore, HUD and the Urban Renewal Agency had been advised of the significance of the buildings at the time of their acquisition. Therefore, when the Urban
Renewal Agency proposed to destroy the buildings in December
of 1974, ten years after the contract, the community was
aroused.
A group known as the Save the Courthouse Committee, an
ordinary community-based group with no particular corporate
status or formal procedures, came into being under the chairmanship of an architectural student named Brian McMann."
That group sought to dissuade the Urban Renewal Agency and
HUD from destroying the buildings, contending that the build-
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ings were of sufficient historical importance that they could not
be replaced: the buildings had been built over a period of 120
years and were a unique historical reflection of the development
of White Plains and central Westchester over that period of
time.
The Urban Renewal Agency insisted on proceeding because
it wanted to sell the site for development as a major retail shopping mall. It became apparent, despite numerous requests from
the Department of the Interior, the State Historic Preservation
Officer, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 0 and the
Save the Courthouse Committee, that the Urban Renewal
Agency intended, with HUD's acquiescence, to destroy the
buildings. An action was acccordingly brought which included
the following allegations: no environmental impact statement
had ever been made for the entire Urban Renewal Project or for
the proposed demolition of the Courthouse; no referral had ever
been made to the Advisory Council for its comments under either NEPA, the Historic Preservation Act, Executive Order
11593,11 or the Advisory Council's own guidelines; and HUD had
failed to follow its own internal guidelines for review of historic
properties and to comply with other judicial requirements concerning the making of these various other decisions. The plaintiffs were raising issues of law which should have been decided
promptly.
The defendants, including the Urban Renewal Agency,
HUD, and the City of White Plains, which intervened as a defendant, sought to use many procedural devices to delay the decision on the merits. They attacked the standing of the plaintiffs, notwithstanding the clear ability of community groups to
raise environmental concerns under relevant Supreme Court decisions. 12 They contended that the court had no subject matter
jurisdiction over the dispute, a frivolous claim. They attacked
the plaintiff for waiting too long under the doctrine of laches,
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had been attempting
throughout the period to dissuade the Urban Renewal Agency,
HUD, and the City from destroying the buildings. In short, the
defendants raised a series of objections that were intended to
avoid a decision on their own statutory responsibilities; all the
objections were dismissed by the court.
Finally, the defendants, in customary American litigation
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posture, sought to foreclose the decision by requiring the plaintiffs to post a large security bond pending the decision of the
court concerning the case. The complaint had been filed on a
Monday, after about a year and a half of negotiating or pleading.
On Thursday, the agency announced its immediate intention to
destroy the buildings. The agency contended that the ensuing
delay while the court considered the matter was going to destroy
the Urban Renewal Program and cost them a great deal of
money. As a result, the court required the plaintiffs to post,
within 48 hours, a $7,000 surety bond. To everybody's surprise,
the plaintiffs raised that money within the 48-hour period.1
After lengthy motions and briefing by all sides, the court
held that HUD had failed to comply with its own internal regulations under NEPA and under the Historic Preservation Act
and that it had failed to adhere to Advisory Council guidelines
deemed incorporated by reference. The significance of that decision as a matter of law is not the subject of this discussion, but
until that time the Advisory Council's own guidelines had never
been enforced by a court. The Courthouse case was the first case
to hold that agencies which fail to develop their own procedures
for seeking Advisory Council review of proposed actions will be
deemed to have adopted Advisory Council procedures.1"
The Courthouse case raised a problem for the United States
Attorney defending HUD because the only real defense was that
the guidelines of the Advisory Council were not enforceable
against another federal agency. The two federal agencies, HUD
and the Advisory Council, were in conflict. It was a difficult
problem for the U.S. Attorney, who solved the dilemma by stating that this was an open question. The court was sensitive to
that problem and solved it by deeming HUD to have adopted
those guidelines on its own rather than squarely holding that the
guidelines were enforceable against HUD.
An important issue addressed by the Courthouse case is the
question of whether the Advisory Council guideline procedures
apply to the review of projects planned prior to the adoption of
the statute in 1966, the promulgation of the Executive Order, or
the adoption of the guidelines. The building at issue had been
slated for demolition since 1966 but, despite amendments to the
Urban Renewal Plan, had never been demolished. Prior case law
suggested that the guidelines were inapplicable. We had trouble
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with those cases when we wrote our brief, and we distinguished
them. The South Hill15 and Kent County"6 cases both held that
action taken before the adoption of the statute or before the implementation of the Executive Order precluded the review of the
proposed demolition by the Advisory Council even where the
demolition was to occur at a later date. The court in the Courthouse case held, however, that the Advisory Council guidelines
had been incorporated and adopted by reference by HUD, and,
according to HUD's internal procedures, HUD had to comply
with the new guideline procedures. Those guidelines were correctly construed by the court to apply to buildings eligible for
inclusion on the National Register but not yet listed.
The court also held that action by a nonfederal partner, in
this case the Urban Renewal Agency, which was sufficiently
under the control of HUD was enough to hold HUD accountable
for the ultimate demolition action. That was an important part
of the case, and it troubled HUD on a national basis. We persuaded the court that HUD's standard form of land disposition
agreement reserved sufficient powers to HUD and that HUD remained substantially responsible for decisions made in connection with the pertinent project. That finding in the Courthouse
case was equally applicable to the NEPA part of the claim and
was also the basis of the court's conclusion that HUD had failed
to comply with its own NEPA regulation.
With a finding by the court that eligibility for nomination
was enough to make review by the Advisory Council obligatory
and that the guideline procedures had been adopted by HUD,
the earlier South Hill and Kent County cases were no longer
significant.
Following the decision, which also expanded the internal
procedures for HUD and other agencies making NEPA-type determinations, the parties entered into a stipulation of settlement. The settlement provided that HUD and the agency would
make a detailed study of the reuse potential of the buildings and
of their historic and cultural significance to the surrounding
White Plains community.
The Courthouse case was not a total victory for the plaintiffs, however, because they were able to secure from HUD only
the commitment to undertake that review pursuant to the Advisory Council procedures and not pursuant to the overall NEPA
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requirements. A study costing about $150,000 was undertaken
by Landauer Associates and others, including the architectural
firm of Goldstone & Heins, to review the historic significance of
the buildings and the possibilities of reuse. The report concluded that the buildings were of historic significance but that
reuse of the properties was not economically feasible. A year and
a half after that report had been received and public hearings
held on it, HUD, the Urban Renewal Agency, the Advisory
Council staff, and the Save the Courthouse Committee participated in extensive negotiations and meetings. Finally, the Advisory Council accepted the conclusions of the Landauer report.
This determination was a bitter disappointment for the
Save the Courthouse Committee. As a result of that determination and the realities of litigation reviewing standards, the committee was forced to enter into a further stipulation that permitted the buildings to be demolished in early 1977.
Prior to the demolition, the Save the Courthouse Committee was permitted to remove significant artifacts and fixtures
from the buildings. A small trust fund was established by the
City of White Plains, in the amount of $75,000, so that a scale
model of the buildings and other historic information concerning
the buildings could be prepared. More significantly, the trust
was established so that major historic preservation programs
and activities could be carried out in the White Plains and
Westchester communities with the balance of that $75,000. In
addition, mindful of their own obligations, the Save the Courthouse Committee induced the defendants to pay $7,000 for the
remaining plaintiff attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses.
It was not a completely satisfactory solution for the Save the
Courthouse Committee, but it was a victory of principle.
The Courthouse case was a major legal victory for the preservation movement but, at the same time, a defeat as far as that
particular building was concerned. To understand the decision,
it is necessary to recognize that there were other limiting factors
not readily apparent in the Courthouse case. When the Save the
Courthouse Committee came to our firm, we had a problem deciding whether to take the case. The White Plains Urban Renewal Program had displaced most of the black community and
the low income community and had promised that there would
be substantial development of housing. That had not yet oc-
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curred. Our firm was unwilling to represent plaintiffs if the objective was to stall the whole Urban Renewal Program for
another five or ten years. But that was not the plaintiffs' position. The objective of most members of the preservationist committee was not to preserve the Courthouse at all costs, but to get
a fair hearing on the feasibility of Courthouse reuse. They
wanted to demonstrate its worth and its ability to play a productive role in the future of the community.
There were probably some members of the committee who
wanted to stop all government redevelopment. For them the
lawsuit was problematic because the goal of the suit was to stop
the entire redevelopment program only while an environmental
impact statement was prepared. This goal led, in part, to the
decision to pursue the Advisory Council procedures rather than
the NEPA procedures. Those who thought that the objective
was to stop the Urban Renewal Program completely were particularly dissatisfied with the decision. They began a second action
as a separate organization. While the Save the Courthouse Committee action had deferred any consideration of the overall environmental aspects of the entire Urban Renewal Plan, the splinter action focused primarily on those considerations.
This was unfortunate because the action was assigned to the
same judge as the original action, and he immediately dismissed
the second case on the ground of laches. The judge found excessive delay, and he did not believe that the splinter group was a
different organization. Furthermore, the environmental policy
requirements of NEPA were deemed inapplicable to the entire
White Plains Urban Renewal Plan on the ground of res judicata. The agency had, therefore, avoided any requirements for
review of the entire planning process, except the state procedures, that had been satisfied.
The Courthouse case leads to several observations about
that particular litigation and the future of successful historic
preservation. HUD, in addition to its continuing intransigence
and disregard for the spirit of the Historic Preservation Act and
for the guidelines of the Advisory Council and of NEPA, did not
undertake a meaningful assessment of its power to compel
change. The local Urban Renewal Agency never intended to
make adaptive reuse of the Courthouse buildings. The Advisory
Council staff was not able to bring to the review process the re-
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sources, professional experience, and funds that were needed for
a serious review of what might have been done to avoid
demolition.
The National Trust and other groups which funded the
plaintiff group organization could have done more than simply
fund litigation expenses. It was also necessary to fund subsequent analysis and review of the economic aspects of the reuse.
Unless that process is pursued as well, future litigation will not
succeed in preserving landmark buildings.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs resisted too long what might
have been viable compromises. It might have been possible to
save one or two of the buildings from the Courthouse district
and move them to another site. That compromise might have
been possible and probably would have preserved much of the
historic value of the overall complex.
The Save the Courthouse Committee was successful, energetic and creative in its ideas, but it is not enough to be successful litigants. A developer's point of view is needed to save buildings. Having won the first skirmish, one must figure out an
economic way for making the buildings work, whether through
use of federal resources or through more conventional methods.
Preservation cannot be considered as a simple choice between funds going for low-income groups or for buildings of historical and cultural significance. It would be a short-sighted
point of view for the preservationist movement to compete for
federal and local funds on that basis. The importance of historic
preservation lies in its broader implications for urban vitality.
Many smaller cities need to retain those historical and architectural elements that have made them different from the surrounding suburban communities. In the long run, preservation
will benefit all groups in the city by making the cities viable and
by giving them the socio-economic base that they have been losing. Preservationists must be cognizant of the immediate and
tangible claims of low-income groups living in the central cities.
In order to achieve the kind of public support needed for the
movement's success, the preservation movement must try to
make the benefits of preservation responsive to the desires and
the perceptions of urban groups.
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Id. § 800.1-.15.
11. Id. §§ 800.1, .4.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 470a.
13. Id. § 470f.
14. Wisconsin Heritages, Inc. v. Harris, 460 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D. Wis. 1978)
(control over funds sufficient to impose NEPA responsibility).
15. Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns v. United States Postal Serv. 516 F.2d 378, 386 (2d
Cir. 1975) (Postal Service not exempt from NEPA requirements).
16. 16 U.S.C. § 470f.
17. 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(b) (1981) states that adverse effects may occur under conditions which include but are not limited to:
(1) Destruction or alteration of all or part of a property;
(2) Isolation from or alteration of the property's surrounding environment;
(3) Introduction of visual, audible, or atmospheric elements that are out of character with the property or alter its setting;
(4) Neglect of a property resulting in its deterioration or destruction;
(5) Transfer or sale of a property without adequate conditions or restrictions regarding preservation, maintenance, or use.
18. 36 C.F.R. § 800.5 (1981).
19. Id. §§ 800.4(d), 800.6(b).
20. Id. § 800.6(b)(2), (3).
21. Id. § 800.6(d).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
23. Exec. Order No. 11,593, 3 C.F.R. 559 (1971-75 Comp.), reprinted in 16 U.S.C.
app. § 470 (1976).
24. 49 U.S.C. § 1653 (1976).
25. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411-13 (1971); Stop H3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
26. Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C. §§ 469-469h
(1976 & Supp. III 1979).
27. Id. § 469a-1.
28. Id.
29. Id. §§ 469a-2, 469a-3.
30. National Heritage Policy Act of 1979, S. 1842, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., proposed
Sept. 28, 1979.

Historic Preservation Litigation: A Case
Study
STEPHEN L. KASS
* B.A., 1961, Yale; LL.B., 1964, Harvard; Partner, Berle, Butzel & Kass.

1. 408 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
2. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is the principal
Federal agency responsible for programs concerned with housing needs, fair housing opportunities, and improving and developing the Nation's communities.
To carry out its overall purpose of assisting the sound development of our communities, HUD administers mortgage insurance programs that help families to become home
owners; a rental subsidy program for lower income families who otherwise could not af-
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ford decent housing; programs designed to eliminate discrimination in housing activities;
and programs that aid neighborhood rehabilitation and the preservation of our urban
centers from blight and decay. HUD also protects the home buyer in the marketplace
and fosters programs that stimulate and guide the housing industry to provide not only
housing but a suitable living environment. See United States Government Manual 321
(1980-81).
3. The White Plains Urban Renewal Agency was created by the New York State
Legislature in 1964 to carry out the White Plains Urban Renewal Plan.
4. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979).
5. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976 & Sipp.
III 1979), amended by 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470-470w-6 (West Pam. 1981).
6. The U.S. Department of Interior published its finding that the Courthouse appeared to meet the criteria for inclusion on the National Register at 38 Fed. Reg. 33,429
(1973).
7. The New York State Division for Historic Preservation notified Westchester
County officials of the suggestion of the inclusion of the Courthouse on the National
Register in the latter part of 1973.
8. 16 U.S.C. § 470a.
9. The committee was an unincorporated citizen's association established for the
purpose of preserving the Westchester County Courthouse as an historical and architectural landmark. The committee numbered approximately 100 persons, the great majority
of whom were residents of White Plains, N.Y. Two of the plaintiffs owned property in
the vicinity of the Courthouse, and one claimed a reversionary interest in the Courthouse
site.
10. The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation was established by § 201 of the
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 470i.
11. Exec. Order No. 11,593, 3 C.F.R. 559 (1971-75 Comp.), reprinted in 16 U.S.C.
app. § 470 (1976). The purpose of the order was to foster implementation of the goals of
the Historic Preservation Act by directing federal agencies to provide leadership in the
area of historic and environmental preservation.
12. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (the
Administrative Procedure Act grants standing to persons who aggrieved interests are
protected by the statute or the constitution; interests may include aesthetic, conservational, recreational, as well as economic, values); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972) (aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important
ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (the fact that the loss
of an environmental benefit cannot be accurately measured does not mean that its loss
will not support a finding of standing).
13. Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. at 1337-38. Section 1 (3) of
Executive Order No. 11,593, supra note 11, iniposed the affirmative duty on federal
agencies to adopt procedures "to assure that Federal Plans and programs contribute to
the preservation and enhancement of non-federally owned" cultural resources. The court
found that because HUD failed to adopt independently derived procedures, it had necessarily adopted the procedures of the Advisory Council.
14. Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. at 1338.
15. South Hill Neighborhood Ass'n v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1025 (1970).
16. Kent County Council for Historic Preservation v. Romney, 304 F. Supp. 885
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(W.D. Mich. 1969).
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The Need for Legislative Reform in the
Area of Federal Programs for Historic
Preservation
NELLIE L. LONGSWORTH
* B.A., Smith College; Registered Lobbyist with the United States Congress; Author, editor and publisher of the national newsletter ALERT; in May, 1978, received the
Gordon Gray Award for Outstanding Achievement in Support of Historic Preservation in
the United States, given by the National Trust for Historic Preservation; Liaison to Historic Resources Committee, American Institute of Architects; President, Preservation
Action, Washington, D.C.
1. 36 C.F.R. §§ 1201-28 (1980) (repealed 1981). The Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service was dissolved in 1981.
2. Urban Development Action Grants, 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (Supp. III 1979); 24 C.F.R.
§§ 570.450-.466 (1980). (UDAG is part of the Community Development Block Grant. See
infra note 3).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-19 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
4. 13 C.F.R. §§ 301.1-318.25 (1981).
5. Id. § 305.
6. See 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), amended by 16 U.S.C.A. § 470
(West Pam. 1981).
7. Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
8. The purpose of investment tax credits is to encourage business to invest in capital
goods and equipment by allowing a percentage of the purchase price as a credit against
corporation taxes due and not merely as a deduction from taxable income. See, e.g., 26
U.S.C. §§ 46, 50 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
9. See supra notes 7 & 8.
10. 36 C.F.R. § 1201.2 (1980) (repealed 1981).
11. 36 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-57.1 (1981). See 36 C.F.R. §§ 65, 67-69 (1981) for recent Historic Preservation regulations.
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